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Efficiency losses in milk marketing boards – 
the importance of exports* 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Following Veeman (1987), a milk marketing board (MMB) is a legislatively specified compulsory 
marketing institution that conducts price discrimination. Since price discrimination leads to 
unequal profitability between products, receipts from sales are pooled and farmers are paid a single 
price adjusted for composition and quality. The exact set-up of MMBs and the corresponding 
pooling arrangements vary between countries. The United States has a pooling arrangement 
involving fluid and industrial milk through the Federal Milk Marketing Order (US-MMO) system. 
In Canada1 and Japan liquid and manufacturing milk prices are pooled regionally. Norway has a 
special arrangement where the pooling takes place through the Norwegian Agricultural Marketing 
Board (NAMB). Until 1994 the United Kingdom had MMBs that set prices on milk to the dairies 
according to end use, and until recently farmers in Australia had to pay a levy that was used to 
subsidize exports. 
It is well documented that price discrimination through MMBs entails an efficiency loss to 
the society. In table 1 we review the most recent documentation, while appendix 1 offers a broader 
list of references. Based on an interregional market equilibrium model that was calibrated on U.S. 
data from 1995, Cox and Chavas (2001) found that eliminating the US-MMOs would lead to a 
decline in the producer surplus by USD 368 million, and an increase in the consumer surplus by 
USD 505 million. The calculated efficiency loss of the USD-MMOs (USD 137 million) amounts 
to 0.7 per cent of the production value of milk. Lippert (2001) reviewed the Canadian milk market 
and evaluated the efficiency loss by the regulation of the Canadian supply of milk to be CAD 200 
million, i.e. 4.8 per cent of the production value. According to Freebairn (1992), the levy on milk 
in Australia generated a relatively small deadweight loss in the domestic market. However, the 
resulting excess production that was exported involved relatively large deadweight losses.2 These 
costs were estimated to be between AUD 25 to AUD 65 million a year, depending on the size of 
                                                                 
*We are indebted to Isabelle Schluep Campo, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zürich, for many valuable 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks also go to Bjørn Sandvik, University of Bergen and Roberto 
Garcia, Agricultural University of Norway. Financial support from the Research Council of Norway, through the 
programme Living Conditions, Development and Restructuring of the Agricultural Sector, is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 The Eastern Agreement on All Milk Pooling and the Western Milk Pooling Agreement. Until the spring of 2003, 
exports (class 5) had a common pool. 
2 The pool pricing arrangements provided farmers with price signals in excess of the export parity price in the size of 
25% for New South Wales, Western Australia and Queensland, 33% for Victoria and 40% for Tasmania. 
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the supply elasticity. For the United Kingdom, Anderson (1996) found that eliminating the MMBs, 
would give an efficiency gain of ecu 298 million. Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser (1997) studied 
the Japanese milk markets. According to their analysis the pooled farm price of milk would 
decrease by 14.7 per cent if markets were deregulated (perfect competition). Unfortunately, they 
did not report any welfare effects. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
From table 1 we read that the efficiency loss from the US-MMOs and from the Australian levy-
system seems to be small. The loss from the Canadian MMB is larger. Based on the research of 
Anderson (1996), the loss from the now abolished British MMBs was more substantial. However, 
one should be careful when interpreting the results from the various studies. First, the MMBs in 
the various countries differ both in type and strength. Second, the assumed elasticities of demand 
and supply affect the results. For example, one reason for the large difference between the loss in 
consumer surplus from upholding the US-MMOs and the UK-MMBs (2.6% versus 12.6%) is that 
the demand for dairy products is assumed to be more elastic in the US compared to the UK study. 
In this paper we focus on another reason for efficiency losses to differ among countries, i.e. 
that the propensity to export varies. As reported by Ippolito and Masson (1978) and Serck-Hansen 
(1979), and more recently by Bergman (1997), exporting MMBs may incur a larger efficiency loss 
than non-exporting MMBs. The argument is as follows. If exports are allowed, milk production 
can be taken out of the domestic market to elevate domestic prices. This results in a large 
deadweight loss because it involves a transfer of money from the home to the foreign country. 
There will also be a welfare loss if an MMB does not export. However, in this case the transfer 
goes between domestic consumers. Consequently, the welfare loss is limited to pure deadweight 
losses in domestic consumption. Ceteris paribus, the efficiency gain from abolishing an MMB 
should therefore be greater in high as compared to low exporting MMBs. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
In table 2, existing MMB-countries are ranked according to the size of the export share, 
found in the first column. The second column repeats the efficiency losses from table 1. The 
United States has a low export share and a low loss, while Canada has a high export share and a 
moderate loss. As is discussed in section 4.1, a main part of the Canadian export is outside the 
MMB-system. We therefore lack results on efficiency gains from abolishing MMBs in countries 
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where the export share is large.3  Against this background Norway may serve as a useful case. 
Exports of dairy products are high and are financed through the MMB system. 
 Section 2 surveys the Norwegian dairy policy in more detail. In particular we discuss the 
market regulation scheme set up by the NAMB. Dairies have to pay a compulsory tax on profitable 
products, while unprofitable products receive a subsidy. By law, this scheme has to be self-
financing, i.e. the collected taxes shall equal the paid subsidies. A numerical model of the 
Norwegian agricultural sector is in section 3 used to simulate the current policy with price 
discrimination through the NAMB (the base solution). The effects of deregulating the markets for 
dairy products are discussed in section 4. First, we assume that export subsidies are phased out. By 
comparing this case with the base solution, the cost of export is revealed. Thereafter, a complete 
deregulation is considered. Here, domestic prices on dairy products equal marginal costs. Thus, 
Harberger distortions in the domestic markets are eliminated. Our conclusion is that substantial 
efficiency gains may be achieved by deregulating the dairy sector. The potential gains are 
substantially higher than for other MMB-countries. The main reasons are that exports are a major 
ingredient of the Norwegian system, and that production costs are very high. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
3 Of the previous MMB countries, Australia has a large export share (appr. 45 %), and, according to table 1, a low 
efficiency loss. However, the low efficiency loss is understandable since Australia is a cost effective country in 
production. According to the International Dairy Federation (2002), the farm gate price was only half of the level in 
the U.S. For England we lack information on exports. 
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2.  The Norwegian dairy policy 
 
The Norwegian dairy market is dominated by a single farmer-owned cooperative. At the farmgate 
level the cooperative’s market share is 98%, which means that nearly all milk farmers are 
members of the cooperative.  The presence in the downstream industry is also strong, with a 
competitive fringe serving only 10% of the end market. 
 As is described carefully in the literature (see e.g. LeVay, 1983), a marketing cooperative 
tends to maximize the output price paid to the members, subject to a budge t constraint, which says 
that the total payments to the members cannot exceed the net revenues from the domestic market 
and the export market. The constraint will always be binding. Thus, the behavior is also known as 
the zero surplus solution. 
 The zero surplus solution is a good approach to the Norwegian dairy market. To maximize 
the farmgate price, the cooperative price discriminates between different end uses of milk (e.g. 
fluid milk, cheese, butter and milk powder) and between different markets (domestic and export).  
Like a price discriminating monopoly would behave, the cooperative limits output in the price 
inelastic markets (e.g. fluid milk). However, compared to a regular vertically integrated monopoly, 
milk production will be higher as the net revenue is disbursed to the members as a part of the 
farmgate price. Naturally, a problem for the cooperative is to avoid cream skimming from entrants 
(private dairy companies) in the high-value segment.  Initially we abstract from this, assuming that 
the cooperative has a monopoly in domestic markets. We also assume that the cooperative is 
protected from foreign competition through prohibitive tariffs.4 
 Figure 1 illustrates the zero surplus solution and compares it to: a) perfect competition, and 
b) the behavior of a regular vertically integrated monopoly. 
[  Figure 1  ] 
In panel a, which depicts the price inelastic market (e.g. fluid milk), the demand for milk is given 
by DA. The more elastic curve DB in panel b represents the demand for other domestic uses of milk 
(cheese, butter, milk powder, etc.). MRA and MRB are the corresponding marginal revenue curves. 
Aggregate curves, illustrating the price-quantity formation under different market structures, are 
                                                                 
4 The import tariffs, resulting from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (GATT, 1994), are in the range of 
250-400 per cent.  Minimum access opportunities equal to 5 per cent of domestic consumption in the base period, are 
established at lower tariffs. 
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presented in panel c. DA+DB is the aggregate demand for milk, while MRA + MRB is the horizontal 
sum of the marginal revenue curves in panels a and b. S is aggregate supply, which is the 
horizontal sum of the marginal cost curves of the individual farmers. We assume constant marginal 
costs in inputs other than milk, for simplicity normalized to zero. EP is the exogenous export price, 
which coincides with the flat part of the marginal revenue curve, MR.   
With perfect competition, the equilibrium solution is at the intersection of the aggregate 
demand and supply curves. The quantity AP+BP is produced, to a farmgate price PP, of which AP 
and  BP are sold in the two domestic markets, respectively. Since the marginal costs in inputs other 
than milk are normalized to zero, the price on both processed goods will, in this case, be equal to 
the farmgate price, PP. 
If, on the other hand, the milk farmers and the dairy sector behaved like a regular vertically 
integrated monopoly, they would supply the quantity AM + BM that follows from the intersection of 
the aggregate marginal cost curve, S, and the aggregate marginal revenue curve, MR. This quantity 
would be distributed among the markets so as to equate the marginal revenues in each market and 
the farmgate price PM. Thus, the price and quantity combinations would be ( MAP , A
M) and ( MBP , 
BM), respectively, in the two end markets. This would leave the cooperative with a substantial 
profit, which would have to be distributed to the members somehow, without affecting the 
quantities supplied (lump sum).   
Unable to distribute profits in a lump sum fashion, the practice has been to raise the 
farmgate price until the net profit in the domestic markets is just as large as the loss in the export 
market. In other words, the farmers are paid a price equal to the average revenue (AR), which is a 
weighted average of the price obtained in different markets. Referring to figure 1, this principle 
results in a farmgate price, P, and a milk production, A + B + E, given by the intersection of the 
farmers’ supply curve, S, and the solid curve, AR, defined as: 
 
EBABBAA PPPAR )1( aaaa --++= , 
 
where ai , i = A,B, is the share of total production sold in the ith domestic market. The price and 
quantity combinations in the domestic markets, which follow from the intersection of the marginal 
revenue curves and the exogeneously given export price (MRA = MRB = EP ), are now ( AP , A
 ) and 
( BP , B). The export price, EP , is below the marginal costs in production.  
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As figure 1 illustrates, total milk production is higher under a cooperative regime than in a 
competitive market (A+B+E > AP+BP), but domestically sold quantities are lower (A < AP; B < 
BP). Obviously, since the export, E, takes place at a price below marginal costs, economic welfare 
is highest in the competitive solution. However, the milk farmers find the cooperative regime more 
attractive since it offers a higher farmgate price (P > PP), as well as a higher activity level. 
Compared to the regular monopoly solution, the cooperative supplies higher quantities in 
the domestic markets (A > AM; B > BM). Nevertheless, economic welfare and producer’s surplus is 
lower because the rent from price discrimination is shifted from domestic producers to foreign 
consumers. So, the producers would prefer a regular monopoly if they were able to distribute 
revenue without affecting production.        
So far we have considered a cooperative that unilaterally has power to set domestic prices. 
In actual fact, this power is restricted by price caps set in annual negotiations between the farmers’ 
organisations and the government. The larger the farmers’ bargaining strength, the closer the price 
caps are to the unregulated prices. We are taking these price caps into consideration in figure 2. 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
Assume the cooperative faces price caps AP   and BP  that are below the unregulated prices. 
The cooperative will then supply A  and B  units in the domestic markets. In panel c of figure 2 
the stepwise curve labeled MR is the (constrained) aggregate marginal revenue curve. The AR 
curve will now be defined by: 
 
AR = aA AP   + aB BP  + (1-aA-aB) EP  
 
where ai , i = A,B, as before, is the share of total production sold in the ith domestic market.  
With AR pricing, production will be EBA ++ .  Again, the export, E, takes place at a 
price below marginal costs in production, leading to a deadweight loss equal to the hatched area in 
panel c.5  There are also deadweight losses in the domestic markets due to price discrimination, 
equal to the hatched triangles in panels a and b. 
                                                                 
5 In 1998 approximately 16% of the Norwegian milk production was exp orted at a loss (today this share is 12%). As a 
means to limit the surplus production of milk, a production quota system applies at the farm level, but the system is 
highly inefficient as the total production level still exceeds by far the quantity necessary to supply the domestic 
market. It is therefore not considered in the model.  
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Price discrimination, exploiting differences in demand elasticities between different end 
products, means unequal profitability between different lines and local dairies. AR pricing is a way 
of pooling revenues and costs. Obviously, this method is equivalent to a system of cross-
subsidization. As will be shown empirically in section 3.2, domestic products like milk powder 
and goat cheese are cross-subsidized by fluid milk, while foreign consumers are cross-subsidized 
by domestic consumers. 
 A system based on cross-subsidization is threatened by cream skimming from entrants 
(private dairy companies) preferring to supply the most profitable products or markets and leaving 
the incumbent (the cooperative) to supply the less profitable products.  Until 1997, cream 
skimming from private dairies was avoided by different kinds of institutional entry barriers.6 In 
June 1997 most of the institutional entry barriers were removed.7 However, at the same time 
NAMB introduced a milk price equalization scheme (MPES). Dairies (including the cooperative) 
are now obliged to pay a tax for profitable products, and for unprofitable products they receive a 
subsidy. By law the scheme is self- financing, i.e. a zero surplus solution where the total taxes 
collected equals the paid subsidies. Let us use figure 2 to illustrate the main principle in the milk 
price equalization scheme. Drinking milk is now taxed by ( PPA - ), milk for other domestic uses 
is subsidized by ( BPP - ), while exports are subsidized by ( EPP - ). Since all dairies are treated 
on an equal basis, cream skimming is avoided. 
The main objective of the MPES is to strengthen competition in the dairy sector by 
removing institutional entry restrictions. As such, the scheme is a response to the general criticism 
that monopolies tend to have low efficiency, and also a response to results of economic research 
that suggest that cooperatives are less efficient than other organization forms (Porter and Scully, 
pp. 511-12, 1987). While this may have led to some improvement in efficiency in the dairy 
industry, the MPES implies no major change in the practice of cross-subsidizing export and some 
domestic products by imposing a levy on other domestic products, especially drinking milk. 
                                                                 
6 It was almost impossible for entrants to get milk supplies from farmers since all the existing milk farmers were 
members of the cooperative and legally unable to change dairy company.  Milk supplies from new farmers were also 
ruled out as a result of a closed quota system.  Potential entrants in the dairy sector were therefore obliged to buy milk 
from the cooperative, which would be their rival in the end market.  Another severe barrier to competition was the 
cooperative’s dual role as competitor in the market place on one side, and as administrator of the pool system on the 
other side.   
7 By repealing the law, which made it difficult for farmers to change dairy company and by introducing tradable 
production quotas at the farm level, the new scheme makes it easier for entrants to receive supplies from the farmers. 
The scheme also facilitates competition by moving the administrative responsibility for the pool system from the 
cooperative to the NAMB. 
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Hence, the issue of welfare losses due to price discrimination and cross-subsidization is just as 
relevant as before the reform.  
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3. Simulation of the current policy 
 
3.1 Model description 
In order to estimate the efficiency loss due to the Norwegian market policy for dairy products, we 
use a price endogenous, partial equilibrium model that includes the most important products and 
factors in the Norwegian agricultural sector.  It is a partial equilibrium model in the sense that 
input prices as well as export prices are determined outside the model and treated as given.  
However, domestic linear demand functions for the main agricultural products are included, hence 
the term price endogenous (see McCarl and Spreen, 1980). 
In this section we focus on some important details regarding the model’s representation of 
the dairy sector. A fuller description of the model is given in appendix 2.8  Eight dairy products or 
aggregates are modeled:  Cow milk, goat milk, fluid milk, cheese, whey cheese9, goat cheese, 
butter and milk powder.  Cow milk and goat milk are delivered from milk farms to dairies.10  The 
remaining products are aggregates delivered from dairies to wholesale or retail dealers. Cow and 
goat milk are converted into dairy products by six different dairy processes or model dairies.  The 
model dairies are characterized by fixed conversion coefficients for milk into each product.  The 
conversion coefficients and processing costs for each model dairy are presented in table 3.  Note 
that four of the model dairies have butter as a by-product. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
The domestic demand functions are linearized to go through the price/quantity combination of the 
base year (1998) using the following demand elasticities: cheese and whey cheese (0.5), butter 
(1.0), milk powder (1.0) and fluid milk (0.3). These elasticities correspond to the common 
assumption that the demand for fluid milk is less elastic than the demand for butter, milk powder 
and cheese, and are roughly in line with several existing studies.11  Cross-price effects are 
neglected as we use broad product aggregates which hardly are close substitutes in consumption, 
except for cheese and whey cheese. 
 
                                                                 
8 The model is designed to perform policy analyses, and has as such been used by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance and 
the Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture.  A detailed description of an earlier version of the model is given in Brunstad et 
al. (1995a). For a description of the current version, see Gaasland et al. (2001). 
9 Whey cheese is a traditional Norwegian product made by boiling down milk and whey.  
10 At the farm level, milk production is represented by about 75 model farms of varying size (from 6 to 200 cows) and 
location (9 production regions), each characterized by fixed input and output coefficients. 
11 See Gustavsen et al. (1998). 
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3.2 The base solution: The milk price equalization scheme (MPES) 
Using the model, we have simulated the agricultural policy in Norway by implementing the actual 
system of subsidies and import barriers in the base year 1998,12 as well as the MPES. As was 
explained in section 2, the MPES means price discrimination between different uses of milk and 
between different markets. The taxes and subsidies in the scheme are listed in table 4. We see that 
the “price- inelastic-processes” (fluid milk and whey cheese) are heavily taxed, while the “price-
elastic-processes” (milk powder and export of cheese) are heavily subsidized. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
The results from this simulation, which is called the base solution, are presented in the first 
column of table 5. Information of production (P) and net imports (I) are given. Consumption is the 
difference between these magnitudes. The numbers in the parentheses are percentage of the actual 
situation. 
 
[Table 5] 
 
For most products there is a good correspondence between the model results and the actual 
situation. An exception is butter, which is a by-product of most dairy processes. For employment 
and land use, there is a substantial deviation between the base solution and the actual situation. 
The reason for this is threefold: First, the model does not cover products as fruit and vegetables. 
Second, extreme small-scale farming is not included. Third, since the available data on the 
production processes are based on better than average farms, the model farms tend to be too 
efficient in the use of labor. 
The level of support given to Norwegian agriculture is extremely high (NOK 15.2 billion 
or USD 2.0 billion).13  Since Norwegian agriculture employs about 60,000 man years, the support 
per man year is about NOK 250,000 (USD 32,500).  Apart from grain, Norway is self-sufficient or 
                                                                 
12 At the farm level, the Norwegian agricultural policy is based on different kinds of subsidies.  First, there are 
substantial budget transfers in the form of deficiency payments (general and regionally differentiated), acreage and 
headage payments, disaster payments, transport subsidies, structural adjustment measures etc.  Second, support is also 
given in the form of import tariffs.  Third, a system of tradable production quotas for milk gives regional protection.  It 
should also be noted that the subsidies in general favor small farms in scarcely populated areas. Consequently, the 
Norwegian agricultural policy is to a large extent directed at rural employment and protection of the family farm.  For 
a recent description of the Norwegian agricultural policy, see OECD (pp. 182-187, 2003.b). 
13 The actual agricultural support in 1998 was approximately NOK 20 billion (USD 2.6 billion). 
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has a surplus in agricultural products. In particular, there are large exports of both cheese and 
butter. 
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4. Deregulation 
 
In two steps we now analyze the effects of deregulating the markets for dairy products. First, we 
assume that export subsidies are abolished. By comparing this case with the base solution, the cost 
of export is revealed. Thereafter, a complete deregulation is assumed by setting all MPES-rates to 
zero. By doing so, we are also able to deduce the efficiency losses caused by Harberger distortions 
in the domestic markets.   
 
4.1 No export subsidies 
While abolishing export subsidies, other MPES-rates are set such that prices on domestic dairy 
products are unchanged. By holding domestic prices and consumption unaltered, we are able to 
isolate export costs.    
Since export prices are way below production costs, in spite of substantial subsidies at the 
farm level,14 the dumping of dairy products stops, as shown in column 2 in table 5.  The 292.4 
million litres (17.5%) decline in milk production, compared to the base solution, is solely due to 
the elimination of exports. 
This leads to a surplus in the MPES-system of NOK 1.2 billion. If this surplus is allocated 
to the milk producers, producer surplus will increase by NOK 0.7 billion (1.5-0.8=0.7) compared 
to the base solution. The overall increase in economic surplus is NOK 1.0 billion, of which NOK 
0.7 billion is due to higher producer surplus, while NOK 0.3 billion can be explained by a lower 
budget support, mainly because of lower milk production and fewer farms. In 1998 the production 
value of milk was NOK 5.7 billion. Consequently, the NOK 1 billion efficiency gain amounts to 
17.5 per cent of the production value.15 
 In a similar experiment for the Canadian dairy sector, Schluep (1999) found that 
elimination of export subsidies leads to an increase in economic surplus equal to 0.7 per cent of the 
production value.16 The reason for this small efficiency loss is twofold: First, a major part of the 
Canadian export is excluded from the Canadian pooling arrangements.17 Second, the cost of 
marginal milk production is substantially lower in Canada than in Norway. 
                                                                 
14 For example, the average revenue from the cheese export process is NOK 24.40, while the costs are NOK 58.25 (not 
reported). The cost–number can be inferred by using table 3: Processing costs for export of cheese is NOK 20.43. The 
market price of milk is NOK 3.40 (not reported). The milk requirement is 11.122. Using this information and adding 
up, NOK 58.25 is the result.   
15 This percentage equals the percentage decrease in the milk production. However, this is an arbitrarily coincidence.    
16 Schluep (1999), p. 105. 
17Class Ve is not included. 
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4.2 Internal deregulation 
In addition to export costs, there are efficiency losses caused by Harberger distortions in the 
domestic markets. To highlight these costs, we assume a complete deregulation, i.e. all MPES-
rates are set to zero. Consequently, we obtain prices which equal marginal costs. Import 
restrictions are maintained, which means that the focus is on internal deregulation. The farm level 
subsidies are unaltered. The exact framing and accomplishment of the deregulation is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but removal of the MPES is a basic condition.  
The results of the experiment are presented in column 3 in table 5 and in table 6. As we 
observe from table 6, not only export is cross-subsidized in the base solution but in particular also 
domestically sold milk powder. The deregulation means an increase in the domestic price of this 
product by as much as 68.9%. Furthermore, in the base solution whey cheese and fluid milk are 
substantially overpriced. Naturally, the consumption of whey cheese and fluid milk increases as a 
result of the transition to cost-based pricing, while the consumption of milk powder decreases. The 
substantial drop in the consumption of milk powder should be seen in the light of the assumed 
unitary price elasticity. 18   
 
[Table 6] 
 
As a result of the deregulation, economic surplus increases by NOK 1.5 billion, i.e. 26.3% 
of the production value of milk. Consumers and taxpayers are the main gainers.  As a result of 
lower domestic prices on fluid milk and whey cheese, and despite higher prices on milk powder, 
the consumer surplus increases by 1.3 billion NOK (23.2% of production value). Due to lower 
milk production, and thereby less subsidies to milk farmers, the taxpayers gain NOK 0.4 billion.  
The producer surplus decreases by NOK 0.2 billion because of the decline in milk production. 
An objection to our model simulation is that deregulation will hardly lead to perfect 
competition and cost-based pricing.  Although institutional entry barriers have been removed, 
there are many kinds of technical and strategic entry barriers, which may continue to hamper 
competition, such as economies of scale, sunk costs and transport costs.19  The industry norm is, as 
noted by Sexton (1990) and Tennbakk (1995), that cooperatives coexist with other firms in 
                                                                 
18 Milk powder is mainly demanded by the processing industry, used as an input in the production of for example 
chocolate and ice cream. The assumed elasticity for milk powder is derived from these products. 
19 Since the introduction of the MPES, three private dairies have expanded their production rapidly. However, they 
still have low market shares, especially at the farm gate level (about 2%). The highest market share is in the wholesale 
market for cheese (about 10%). Other entrants have tried to enter the market, but have failed. 
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markets that are structural oligopolies or oligopsonies. Thus, the estimate in this section should be 
interpreted as the maximum gain by deregulating the dairy sector. 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
 
A marketing board is a well known instrument for regulating the markets for dairy products. Since 
it is based on price discrimination, it causes economic losses. Our findings suggest that a 
deregulation of the Norwegian dairy industry could increase the economic surplus by as much as 
26.3% of the milk production value. This computed gain is far larger than for the other countries 
reviewed in table 1 and 2. The main reasons are that exports are a main ingredient of the 
Norwegian MMB, and that production costs of milk are very high in Norway. In addition, there is 
some evidence that the Norwegian MMB-regulation is stronger than in other countries, based on 
the following reasoning: The strength of a country’s regulation may be estimated by the effect on 
the price of fluid milk, since fluid milk is regarded as the most inelastic product and therefore most 
exposed for taxation. For the U.S. this indicator is 13.9% (Cox and Chavas (2001), p. 101), 
compared to 19.8% for Norway (table 6). 
The literature offers many arguments in favour of MMBs or marketing cooperations. In a 
recent article by Bouamra-Mechemache et al. (2001), the possibility of introducing an MMB in the 
EU is discussed. Their argument is that, as long as the total milk production is kept unchanged by 
the quota system, an MMB is an effective way of transferring money from consumers to farmers. 
The reason is according to Bouamra-Mechemache et al. (2001, p. 9) that “the welfare cost of price 
discrimination policy could be as low as, or lower than fully decoupled payments when the 
opportunity cost of public funds is taken into considerations.” However, this argument is not valid 
if transfers are used to promote exports. 
 When evaluating the regulations, there is always the question whether there are social 
benefits to outweigh the substantial costs of the current policies.  There are several alleged benefits 
of regulation, spanning from the original objectives in the 1930s, namely to raise and stabilize milk 
prices and offset monopsony power, to current objectives related to rural employment and farm 
incomes.  However, under the present market conditions it is hardly probable that these benefits 
justify government interventions of the magnitude we have described for Norway. The regulations 
may have been relevant at the time when they were passed, i.e. during the depression in the 1930s, 
but they are now out of date due to technological development and structural change. For example, 
farmers’ bargaining power towards dairy companies has increased due to lower transportation 
costs and better conservation methods.  The rationale for price stabilizing interventions in the 
market is also weakened, partly because farm level production has become more predictable, and 
partly because technology makes it easier to deliver milk products in time (storage) and space 
(trade).  Regarding rural employment, it might be argued that deregulation will have a negative 
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effect on agricultural employment in rural areas, estimated to be 4,000 man-years (-10.2%).20 
However, it is well established that the most efficient way to achieve rural employment is by 
means of general income support to all inhabitants or general wage subsidies to all industries in a 
particular region (see e.g. Winters 1989-1990), and not by support confined to a single industry.  If 
the authorities still want to pay specific support to agriculture, production neutral support is 
definitely more efficient than export subsidies and price support of the kind used in the Norwegian 
dairy sector. 
So why does an arrangement that is not desirable neither for economic nor for social 
reasons continue to exist? One answer is that MMBs serve as a useful instrument for farmers, and 
through lobbying they have been able to maintain this institution. However, discrimination 
between foreign and domestic products is a violation of basic WTO-principles. In the Uruguay 
Round it was agreed that by the end of the year 2000 export subsidies should be reduced by 36% 
as of the situation in 1992. In the ongoing Doha round in WTO, it is agreed to eliminate export 
subsidies with 2013 as a deadline. The harm from MMB arrangements such as the Norwegian 
NAMB will thus be reduced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
20 See Brunstad, Gaasland and Vårdal (1995b) for a more detailed discussion of issues regarding rural employment. 
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Appendix 1. Efficiency loss in MMBs 
 
Country  Description   Welfare Loss 
(i) Canada 
Schmitz (Barichello) Abolishing fluid and industrial CAD 214 million annual welfare gain 
   milk regulation   CAD 955 million annual loss in producer surplus 
1980 CAD 980 million annual gain in consumer surplus 
CAD 303 million annual gain for taxpayers 
 
Lippert   Abolishing fluid and industrial CAD 200 million annual welfare gain 
   milk regulation   CAD 987 million annual transfer from consumer to 
2000 producers 
 
 
(ii) USA 
Dardis/Bedore   Eliminating MMO  USD 343-608 million annual welfare gain 
   1985      
 
Helmberger/Chen Long run impact of  USD 444 million annual loss in producer surplus 
 eliminating MMO   USD 1 billion annual gain in consumer surplus for fluid  
1990    milk  
USD 648 million annual loss in consumer surplus for 
manufactured milk 
        
Cox/Chavas  Eliminating MMO  USD 137 million annual welfare gain 
   1995    USD 368 million (2.3%) decrease in producer surplus 
       USD 505 million (0.9%) increase in consumer surplus 
 
(iii) Japan   
Kawaguchi et al.  Deregulation   14.7 % decrease in the milk price 
 
 
(iv) Australia 
Freebairn   Abolis hing the levy system AUD 25-65 million in estimated welfare gain  
   1988/1989             
 
 
(v) United Kingdom  
Anderson  Eliminating MMB  Ecu 89 mill. (2.54%) decrease in producer surplus 
   1994    Ecu 387 mill. (2.61%) increase in consumer surplus  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21  
Appendix 2.  The model 
 
For given input costs, demand functions and support systems the model computes market clearing 
prices and quantities. Prices of goods produced outside the agricultural sector or abroad are taken as 
given. As the model assumes full mobility of labor and capital, it must be interpreted as a long run 
model. 
 The model includes the most important products produced by the Norwegian agricultural 
sector, in all 13 final and 8 intermediary products. Most products are aggregates.  Primary inputs are: 
land (three different grades), labor (family members and hired), capital (machinery, buildings, 
livestock and ditches) and other inputs (fertilizers, fuel, seeds, etc.). The prices of inputs are 
determined outside the model and treated as given. 
 On the supply side the model has about 1000 model farms with fixed coefficients (Leontief 
technology), covering 19 different production activities in 6 scales and 9 regions. The regional 
division reflects differences in climatic conditions, support systems and available land. The products 
from the model farms go through processing plants before they are offered on the market. The 
processing plants are partly modeled as pure cost mark-ups (meat, eggs and fruit), and partly as 
production processes of the same type as the model farms (milk and grains). Imports take place at 
given world market prices inclusive of tariffs and transport costs. Domestic and foreign products are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes. 
 The domestic demand for final products is represented by linear demand functions. These 
demand functions are based on existing studies of demand elasticities, and are linearized to go 
through the observed price and quantity combination in the base year (1998). Between the meat 
products there are cross-price effects, while only own-price effects are considered for other products. 
The demand for intermediary products is derived from the demand for the final products for which 
they are inputs. Exports take place at given world market prices.  
 Domestic demand for final products is divided among 5 separate demand regions, which have 
their own demand functions. Each demand region consists of one or several production regions. If 
products are transported from one region to another, transport costs are incurred. For imports and 
exports, transport costs are incurred from the port of entry and to the port of shipment respectively. 
 In principle, restrictions can be placed on all variables in the model.  The restrictions can be 
divided into two groups: 
 
(1) Scarcity restrictions: upper limits for the endowment of each grade of land in each region.   
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(2) Political restrictions: lower limits for land use and employment in each region, for  groups of 
regions (central regions and remote areas), or for the country as a whole; maximum or 
minimum quantities for domestic production, imports or exports; maximum prices. 
  
Different types of objective functions are used, depending on the market structure. When assuming 
perfect competition, total economic surplus (consumer surplus, producer surplus and importer 
surplus) of the agricultural sector is maximized. The maximization is performed subject to demand 
and supply relationships and the imposed restrictions. The restrictions applied depend on the scenario. 
The solution to the model is found as the prices and quantities that give equilibrium in each market. 
No restrictions must be violated, and no model farm or processing plant that is active, must be run at a 
loss. 
 The model reports figures like production, use of inputs, domestic consumption and prices, 
import and export, support and economic surplus measured as the sum of consumer, producer and 
importer surplus. A more technical description of the model is given in Brunstad et al. (1995a). 
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Appendix 3. Subsidies and taxes given by the NAMB 
 
The taxes and subsidies in table 4 equal the difference between revenues and costs of the various 
dairy processes in table 3. In principle, these rates equal the official rates given by the NAMB. 
However, there are some differences. First, the rates of NAMB are tied to products rather than 
processes. Second, NAMB uses more disaggregated products and markets than in our model. 
Third, transportation costs are rebated separately. Fourth, the rates are measured at a higher level 
of the vertical chain than in the model. In this appendix we compare the official rates with the rates 
reported in table 4.   
 NAMB comprises two arrangements: 
1) The milk price equalization scheme (MPES) that taxes some products and gives subsidies 
to others. Furthermore, MPES grants subsidies for transportation of milk from farms to 
dairies and from dairies to retailers. 
2) A marketing fee is collected on all milk delivered to dairies. In 1998 this fee was NOK 0.23 
per liter farm milk, and it was used to finance exports of cheese and butter, to subsidize 
transportation, to cover administrative expenses and to finance a program for school milk. 
 
A.3.1 Official tax and subsidy rates 
In table A.1 the MPES-rates are adapted to our level of aggregation. The first column reports the 
official tax and subsidy rates given by the MPES. A negative entry means a subsidy. The second 
column reports how much farm milk is needed to produce one unit of the product. Then, weighted 
by the commodity shares in the third column, the fourth column gives the tax and subsidy rate for 
the various products in the model.  
 In the table there are altogether eight product aggregates. The first six refer to domestic 
sales, while the last two are for exports. Notice that exports are financed both through the MPES 
and the marketing fee. 
 
[Table A.1] 
 
Multiplying the bold marked product rates in table A.1 with the coefficients in table 3, we 
obtain tax and subsidy rates on a process level, reported in the first column of table A.2. 
Transportation subsidies are written into the second column, and net rates are found in the third 
column. 
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[Table A.2] 
 
 
A.3.2 The tax and subsidy rates used in the model  
The official MPES rates are based on a farm gate price of NOK 3.893 per liter.21 In reality, the 
farm gate price is lower (NOK 3.40 per liter). The wedge is due to: 
(i) the milk marketing fee,   
(ii) the loss in the dairy sector which is passed on to the farmers, and  
(iii) additional costs covered by the farmers.  
In 1998 the marketing fee was NOK 0.23 per litre farm milk. The remaining NOK 0.263 is 
costs attributable to (ii) and (iii). To take account of the wedge, the MPES rates are adjusted by 
multiplying NOK 0.493 with the respective farm milk requirement of each process, given in the 
first line of table 3. For the milk process this amounts to NOK 0.493x1.013 = NOK 0.50. This 
adjustment is written into the second column of table A.3. The third column gives the adjusted 
MPES rates. 
 
[Table A.3] 
 
We also have to make some individual corrections. As for exports the MPES-rates are 
based on prices at a higher level of the vertical chain than in our model. With regard to goat cheese 
the MPES-rates are based on the farm gate price of goat milk, while our model treats goat milk as 
a separate product. Finally, whey cheese is based on a separate arrangement for subsidizing whey. 
When taking this into account, we obtain the model rates in the last column.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
21 See Omsetningsrådets Sekretariat (1998), p. 34. 
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Table 1: Efficiency loss in MMBs 
 
 Research Production 
value 
(million) 
Loss in 
consumers’  
surplus 
(per cent of 
production value) 
Gain in 
producers’ 
surplus 
(per cent of 
production value)  
Efficiency loss 
(per cent of 
production value)  
 
Existing MMBs 
     
Canada Lippert (2001) CAD 4,1871 - - 4.8 
United States Cox/Chavas (2001) USD 19,6132 2.6 1.9 0.7 
 
Previous MMBs 
     
Australia Freebairn (1992)    1.4-3.83 
United Kingdom Anderson (1996) Ecu 3,0644 12.6 2.9 9.7 
1Lippert (2001), p. 9 and p. 57  
2Cox and Chavas (2001), p. 98 and p. 102 
3Freebairn (1992), pp. 35-37 
4Anderson (1996), p. 64, p. 145 and pp. 151-152 
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Table 2: Export share in dairy products and efficiency losses in existing MMBs 
 
 Export share1 
Per cent; 1999 
Efficiency loss 
Per cent of 
production                                            
value 
Norway 15.0  
Canada 10.0 4.8 
United States 3.9 0.7 
Japan 0.0  
1International Dairy Federation (2002), country reports pp.22-44 and table 21 
2OECD (1996) 
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Table 3:  Production processes in the dairy sector 
 
Product                                       Process 
 Fluid milk    Cheese dom.  Cheese export   Whey cheese    Goat cheese   Milk powder    
Cow milk (litre)    -1.031           -10.061        -11.122             -12.260                                     -12.340              
Goat milk (litre)                                                                                                   -8.690 
Fluid milk (litre)       1.000 
Cheese, domestic (kg)                             1.000                                     1.000 
Cheese, export (kg)                                                 1.000 
Whey cheese  (kg)                                                                            0.529                 
Goat cheese (kg)                                                                                                    1.000 
Milk powder  (kg)                                                                                                                             1.000 
Butter  (kg)      0.006              0.194            0.177                                                                  0.586                
Processing costs1  (NOK)     3.07              19.50            20.43                18.50                 15.88               14.71 
1These costs are scaled to balance total revenues and costs. The scaling factor constitutes 1.5% of the input value (25 
million NOK) of farm milk. This factor can be interpreted as the costs which are left out at the process level, like 
administration costs in the milk price equalization scheme. 
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Table 4: Tax (+) and subsidies (-) in the Norwegian MMB 
 
Process Tax/Subsidy 
 (NOK per process unit)  
% of production value 
Fluid milk 1.70   20.6% 
Cheese, domestic -2.44     4.8% 
Cheese, export -31.99 131.2% 
Whey cheese 10.72   15.1% 
Goat cheese -1.63     3.3% 
Milk powder -18.39   48.1% 
Butter, export *) -10.90  80.7% 
*) NOK per product unit  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Production, trade, support, economic surplus and main input levels in the Norwegian agriculture 
 
 Base solution  No export  Internal deregulation 
    
 
Production (P) and net imports (I):  
 
P 
 
I 
 
P 
 
I 
 
P 
 
I 
(million kilos)       
    Cow milk *) 1671.5 (100)  1379.1  1308.1  
        Fluid milk *)   635.4 (100)  635.4  677.1  
        Cheese     75.7 (103) -25.1 50.7  50.4  
        Whey cheese     11.8 (100) -3.3 8.5  10.9  
        Milk powder     14.5   (94)  14.5                  4.7  
        Butter     22.3 (147) -10.2 19.0  12.6  
    Goat milk *)     22.2   (99)  22.2  21.8  
        Goat cheese       2.6 (100)  2.6  2.5  
    Meat   233.0   (94) 1.0 233.5 1.0 233.6 1.0 
    Coarse grains 1021.3 (101) 135.0 928.1 135.0 904.7 135.0 
    Wheat   210.5 (105) 263.0 209.9 263.7 209.3 264.3 
    Potatoes   298.0   (96)  299.1  299.0  
    Eggs     43.8   (99) 0.7 43.8 0.7 43.8 0.7 
 
Employment: (1000 man-years) 
 
    59.7   (73) 
  
56.4 
  
55.1 
 
    Remote areas         40.1  36.3  35.1  
    Central area     19.6  20.1  20.0  
 
Land use: (million hectares) 
 
     0.85   (86) 
  
0.79 
  
0.78 
 
 
Economic surplus: (billion NOK) 
 
    14.4 
  
15.4 
  
15.9 
 
    + Consumers’ surplus     21.9  21.9  23.2  
    + Producers’ surplus      0.8  0.3  0.6  
    + Surplus MPES      0.0  1.2  0.0  
    + Tariff revenues      0.3  0.3  0.3  
    -  Taxpayers’ expenses      8.6  8.3  8.2  
 
Support: (billion NOK) 
 
    15.2  (77) 
  
15.0 
  
13.8 
 
    Budget support       8.6   (71)  8.3  8.2  
    Border measures      6.6   (86)  6.7  5.6  
           
*)  Million litres 
 
   
Table 6: Wholesale prices (NOK per kg or litre) 
 
Product         Domestic wholesale prices   
Base              Internal            Percentage  
solution     deregulation           change                      
Fluid milk       8.14                  6.53             - 19.8% 
Cheese    46.60                47.37             +  1.6% 
Whey cheese   45.95                20.12             - 56.2% 
Goat cheese   49.36                51.13             +  3.5% 
Milk powder     24.18                40.83             +68.9% 
Butter   24.04                23.32             -  3.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table A.1: The rates in the MPES  
 
 
Rate (R) 
NOK per liter 
Raw  milk 
Conversion (C) 
Liter raw milk per 
product unit 
Share (S) RxSxC 
NOK per product unit 
Fluid milk aggregate 
     Yoghurt 
     Drinking milk 
     Chokomilk 
     Milk for industrial use 
     Full cream 
 
 
0.958 
1.602 
-0.036 
-0.914 
7.7321 
 
0.895 
1.098 
1.168 
1.142 
1.036 
 
0.043 
0.820 
0.022 
0.058 
0.057 
 
0.0369 
1.4424 
-0.0009 
-0.0605 
0.4566 
1.8745 
Cheese aggregate, domestic 
     Cottage cheese 
     Cheese for consumption 
     Cheese for industrial use 
 
 
0.0932 
-0.097 
-0.389 
 
6.379 
11.122 
11.040 
 
0.22 
0.53 
0.25 
 
0.1305 
-0.5718 
-1.0736 
-1.5149 
Whey cheese 2.6313 7.874  20.706 
Goat cheese 0.284 8.690  2.47 
Milk powder -0.854 12.340  -10.5384 
Butter -8.5915 2.2386  -19.2267 
Export of cheese 
      Brand name (MPES) 
      Bulk 
(i) MPES 
(ii) Marketing fee   
 
-1.333 
 
-0.389 
-2.223 
 
11.122 
 
11.040 
 
0.607 
 
0.393 
 
 
-9.000 
 
-1.688 
-9.645 
-20.333 
Export of butter (Marketing fee)    -6.15 
1NOK per liter cream 
2Average of the rates for consumption and industrial use  
3NOK per liter whey 
4Liter whey per kilo whey cheese 
5NOK per liter cream 
6Liter cream per kilo butter 
Sources: 
Gaasland et al. (2001), pp. 22-25. 
Omsetningsrådet (1998), p. 10. 
Omsetningsrådets Sekretariat (1998), p. 14 and p. 34. 
 
 
   
Table A.2: Subsidy and tax rates in the MPES. Process level 
 
 MPES-gross rates  
NOK per process unit 
Transport,a.s.o. 
NOK per process unit 
MPES-net rates 
NOK per process unit 
Processes: 
       Fluid milk  
       Cheese, domestic  
       Whey cheese  
       Goat cheese  
       Milk powder  
       Cheese, export   
 
1.76 
-5.25 
9.44 
2.47 
-21.81 
-23.73 
 
-0.60 
-2.01 
-2.45 
-2.47 
-2.72 
-1.98 
 
1.16 
-7.26 
6.99 
0.00 
-24.53 
-25.71 
Sources: Gaasland et al. (2001), pp. 22-25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Table A.3: The MPES rates used in the model   
 
 MPES-net 
rates 
Marketing fee 
and deficit 
Adjusted 
MPES-rates 
Model rates 
Domestic Sale 
       Milk process 
       Cheese process 
       Whey cheese process 
       Goat cheese process 
       Milk powder process 
 
1.16 
-7.26 
6.99 
0.00 
-24.53 
 
0.50 
4.96 
6.04 
2.63 
6.08 
 
1.66 
-2.30 
13.03 
2.63 
-18.45 
 
1.70 
-2.44 
10.72 
-1.63 
-18.39 
Export 
       Cheese process 
       Butter 
 
-25.71 
-6.15 
 
4.28 
 
-21.43 
-6.15 
 
-31.99 
-10.90 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 1. Market structure: cooperative versus perfect competition and vertically integrated monopoly  
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Figure 2.  Cooperative facing price caps 
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